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TICOM/I-159

REPORT ON G.A.F. INTELLIGENCE BASED ON INTERROGATION
OF HAUPTMANN Z E T Z S C H E.

Attached are extracts of A.D.I. (K) report No. 394/1945, the second of a series dealing with G.A.F. Intelligence during the War, and based mainly on the interrogation of Hauptmann ZETSCHÉ who was in Control of Gruppe A of Foreign Air Force West, under Chef Ic.

"Y. Service" matters are only touched on; a series of eight reports covering this subject will shortly be issued.

TICOM

28 October 1945

No. of pages 3.

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Handwritten notes and markings on the right margin, including a circled 'G', a circled '9', and a signature '9.11'.

GERMAN "Y" SERVICE

1. The German Y-Service -- Abteilung 3 of General MARTINI's staff -- supplied collated data to Chef Ic. In spite of Generalleutnant SCHMID's complaints of that department's methods of working (see Part I para. 31), Hauptmann ZETZSCHE stated that this source provided extensive data for Allied Order of Battle, subordinations and chains of command, operations, radar developments and ferryings of aircraft from the U.S.A.
2. Four sub-sections of Abteilung 3 covered all aspects of Allied activities, and issued daily intelligence summaries which were telephoned or teleprinted to Chef Ic. Ten-day and monthly appreciations of Allied activity were also issued, the latter containing valuable statistics of Allied incursions.
3. One section, Chi-Stelle (codes and cyphers) Referat B covered all radio and radar intelligence on the western front such as details of current air operations, including Gee-H and Oboe attacks. The southern front was similarly covered by Chi-Stelle Referat C, and a sub-section, Referat C-1, dealt with Allied transport and ferrying traffic; this latter was of special value to Ic in assessing Allied production and losses.
4. Radar intelligence from both Western and Southern fronts was collated by a section known as Funkleitstand. A monthly report was issued which was of great help to Ic in assessing Allied radar and the effects of German jamming. A liaison officer was maintained by Funkleitstand with the P/W Interrogation Centre at Oberursel for the purpose of clearing up obscure points by interrogation of Allied aircrew.
5. Another section, the Zentrale Funkaufklärung (ZAF) was set up at Treuenbrietzen for tactical evaluation of radio and radar data received in the area of Jagdkorps I. As this section was solely concerned with tactical considerations, its relations with Chef Ic were not close.

BROADCAST MONITORING.

6. Of special interest and value were the broadcast links between the news agencies and their correspondents in the various capitals of the world. Of broadcasting stations, the B.B.C. and Swiss stations were considered the most reliable, Daventry in particular being appreciated for its figures concerning Allied sorties and losses. Indeed, during the period between the invasion and collapse, B.B.C. reports were often the only source of reliable information on the war situation.
7. Radio monitoring was done by O.K.W.-Chi, its Naval counterpart the Seehausdienst, and the Forschungsamt, the results being sorted out and distributed by Ic/Luftwesen.

DIPLOMATIC REPORTS

8. Reports from the Foreign Office and agencies abroad came to Ic. both through Amtsgruppe Ausland of O.K.H. and through the Ic Liaison Officer with the Foreign Office, Hauptmann EHRENHAUS (Ic/Luftwesen/Pol). They were of little military value.

9. Intelligence concerning foreign diplomatic exchanges was received from the Forschungsamt (subordinated directly to GOERING) through Ic/Luftwesen/Abwehr, and was given a restricted distribution. It consisted of intercepted Allied radio-telegrams (e.g. London-Stockholm), ordinary radio reports (e.g. Atlantic Radio) and intercepted traffic between diplomats and ministers on certain links, e.g. Ankara-Moscow (Turks), Bern-Washington (Americans), London-Washington (Poles).

10. The last-mentioned source was of great value before and during the invasion and after the breaking-off of Turkish-German relations. In general the Forschungsamt reports contained a great deal of significant information concerning economic and political matters.

APPENDIX I.

AN ASSESSMENT BY HAUPTMANN ZETSCHKE OF THE RELATIVE

CONTRIBUTIONS OF IC SOURCES TOWARDS FINAL APPRECIATIONS BY CHIEF IC.

A. ORDER OF BATTLE.

W/T Listening Service	70%
P/W Statements)	
Captured Material)	20%
Press	1%
Air Photos	9%

B. SUBORDINATIONS AND CHAINS OF COMMAND

W/T Listening Service	50%
P/W Statements)	
Captured Material)	5%
Press	45%

C. PERSONALITIES.

Press	90%
P/W Statements)	
Captured Material)	10%

D. OPS. APPRECIATIONS.

P/W Statements	55%
Captured Material	20%
W/T Listening Service	20%
Press	5%

E. TECHNICAL APPRECIATIONS.

P/W Statements	30%
Captured Equipment	50%
Press	20%

F. ESTIMATES OF ENEMY PRODUCTION.

Ferrying and O.B. Data (Mainly W/T Listening Service)	35%
Enemy Losses	30%
Radio and Press	30%
P/W Statements	4%
Agents' Reports	1%

G. ESTIMATES OF ENEMY LOSSES.

P/W Statements	20%
Press and Radio	40%
W/T Listening Service	30%
Neutral Reports	9%
Agents' Reports	1%